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Abstract
Housing policies have been mostly analysed as a sectoral policy across countries.
This paper, written within a European research project (HOSE), aims a slightly different
approach while housing policy is considered in a broader context of welfare provision.
Comparing structural developments in housing and labour markets in some EU
countries and the associated household behavioral responses will enable us to highlight
the trend in the future social welfare provision. Particularly we will look at the possible
friction between the homeownership incentives and the labor mobility needs.
In this paper we sum up some of the main changes carried out in the last five
years, we will identify the main trends in housing and labour markets, considering them
as an important territorial issue, interfering in the future of the competitiveness in a small,
back warded and open economy. Finally we will present some considerations about
policy implications and research agenda on the subject.
According to the group template, in the first section we refer to some structural
developments starting from the research questions, urban change and social changes in
the new paradigm, ending with the shifts in household structure, housing and labour
markets situations. 
In the second section we establish some considerations about the behavioral
responses of the agents. In the third section some policy implications are mentioned and
conclusions are drawn.1. STRUCTURAL DEVELOPMENTS
- Policy objectives and mechanisms with respect to home ownership
- Structure of housing finance systems for home ownership (mortgage finance)
- Public and private support with housing costs for homeowners, including safety net
provision
1.1. From past research to the new questions
In the very beginning of another research project (1996), the central focus relied
upon the comparison across the four southern European systems - Portugal, Spain, Italy
and Greece – under the assumption that they had a different path facing the northern
European housing systems. We had a personal intuition that something could be different
“at home”. People, history, household structure, life pattern, preferences and even the
weather, social communication and custom traditions, could play an important role on
housing provision systems. We tried to understand the extent that these several
differences could play in housing practices, considering the social and economic
development lag between northern and southern Europe post-1945 war.
In the first research period (1996-97) we characterised each country situation
using an in-depth approach on each housing system, and setting up a framework
composed by the housing provision, financing, tenure, prices, diversity, urban change
processes, social housing, and so on. In other words, we wanted to know more about
ourselves
1.
In the second research period, after November 1997 – Paris - the group co-
ordinators
2 introduced a new viewpoint on the theme, opening the research group to other
colleagues, which shifted the research goal to the European welfare system transition
process. Housing provision ‘became’ part of the broader welfare delivery policy. 
Madrid’s seminar (December 1998) enhanced the importance of this shift.
Housing system is not seen 'anymore' as a question of database comparison but an
important territorial and social issue. We needed to stress and understand at what extent
                                                
1 See Carvalho, P. G. (1998). Public intervention on housing: the Portuguese case, paper presented in
Madrid, 2-4 December 1998, ENHR International Housing Conference: "Housing in southern Europe: a
different path?".the underlined differences could lead us to different (best or worst) global reactions
facing the EU welfare challenges. Some of the invited experts (Hugo Priemus – NL and
Bengt Turner, SE) devaluated those differences between N-S housing systems, saying the
focus should be centred on the historical development lag, which the EU economic
convergence, sooner or later, will solve (the neoclassical approach).
The research evolved then to a different framework analysis. As Judith Allen
wrote in her presented draft (February 1999) “...the biggest conceptual problem is to
move from a fairly descriptive concept about the interrelationship between family and
housing to a more analytical concept of society and welfare”.
The research questions became then: 
-  "Taking into account the differences in each country ability for social regeneration,
could southern European countries have a comparative advantage in housing and
social welfare delivery?" 
-  "Which outcome could be predicted in order to achieve a better adaptation/reaction
facing the general shift in the EU welfare policies?"
In this HOSE project started in York (October 2000), we were asked to express
ideas relating housing markets, labour markets and social welfare provision. That is the
way I intend to write this paper, according to my past research knowledge and adding a
few more conclusions about recent database analysis.
1.2. Housing policy and urban change in Portugal
Housing systems analysis must consider explicit and implicit housing policies, in
order to stress the main consequences in housing provision and in social structure (Allen,
Maldonado et al. 1998).
Housing construction is still a complex process in the great part of the country.
This complexity is due on one side, to the late and incipient industrialisation process,
which is responsible for the existence of an important traditional self-construction sector;
on the other side, it is also the result of a strong centralisation in housing policy, which
created peculiar informal and personal practices at the local level.
                                                                                                                                                
2 Liliana Padovani and Jesus Maldonado Leal (ENHR).In fact, Portugal followed over time a centralised housing policy. There is no
regional or intermediate administration level, which induced diversified and asymmetric
housing provision practices at the local level. Moreover, Portuguese emigration flows
during the 60s and early 70s, allowed capital inflows that were the basis for diverse
kinship and family networks tied with housing self-provision.
Although local policies in Europe progressively (after the 80s) rely upon market
relationships, housing is still a very speculative business in great part of Portugal.
Housing represents the most important asset in family patrimony, absorbing almost the
household savings
3. Due to the implicit policy of non-severe inspection upon housing
construction and the incipient planning practices, households and constructors are
stimulated to pursue self-promotion looking after tax evasion benefits. The social cost of
these procedures can be measured by the general low quality in housing supply, an
increase in environmental costs and a pattern of spatial segregation and social exclusion
expressed through maintenance and repair works. Beyond this, informal market practices
also lowered demand exigency and created a considerable economic loss expressed in
lower city competitiveness and sustainability.
Within this housing development pattern, a double negative effect emerged in
different cities: over-agglomeration and surrounding struggles, claiming for different
social and welfare policies. The Housing Portuguese ‘map’ in the 90s underlines the
different scale of the problem: on one side, we have a predominantly rural territory,
regardless of 65% of the total population living in the two main cities – Lisbon and Porto;
on the other side we have a huge urban sprawl, across the rest of the country.
According to this, it will be strategically inappropriate to treat rural and urban
issues separately as central government keep doing it. Urban centres are very dependent
on the quality of their closest rural areas. Portugal and Greece show, in a major extent, a
higher dependency ratio (Allen, Maldonado et al. 1998) and we know that this is a
territorial pattern associated with rural areas, suggesting different and concentrated
                                                
3 In Portugal, B. d. (1996). “Riqueza e Rendimento em Portugal: primeira abordagem do IPEF.” Boletim
Económico(Junho): 55-71. The table and graphic in pages 57-60 show that housing respond for 70% of the
global household wealth.territorial policies. Of course these policies will produce different impacts, depending on
the age structure of the population living there.
1.3. Social changes and the new paradigm
Housing policy discussion definitely deals with economic activity location.
Agriculture and nature-dependant activities are much less mobile across locations, while
manufacturing and especially the modern information-based services can easily be moved
across regions.
Paul Kantor (Kantor 1995) wrote “...both capital and labour have become
increasingly mobile and it is in this set of perpetual economic instability and the
pervading threat of ‘capital flight’ that urban governance has had to adapt”.
Furthermore he argues that welfarist policies delays general commodity provisioning that
asks for efficiency in a market environment, which represents a negative impact in the
economic city competitiveness.
This argument is valid if we consider labour force (mainly the skilled segments)
as imperfectly transferable across cities and there is a large set of variables that unable
mobility (v. g., the existence of family support, homeownership, children schools, elder
family care, property rights, etc).
Within a great part of the Portuguese households we can find three important and
simultaneous income sources represented by: agricultural self-consumption activities,
industry wages and service salaries. The great part of the citizens living in Lisbon and
Porto is also a member of those families. The same applies to a number of the immigrants
all over the European countries.
In consequence, policies focused on urban worker training programmes, minimum
individual income, rent subsidies and health/educational care provision, could be
interesting attempts to fix population, increasing their self-esteem and boosting the skill
base of the local labour force in declining areas. Migration will be the alternative, but less
likely to occur in a new technological and information society. With this kind of
territorial policies, social cohesion would be improved at a lower social cost rather than if
it is done with sectoral policy. If we could figure out this emergent urbanisation model, then it is possible to
assert that countries based on kinship and family networks (so typical in southern
European countries) could have a comparative advantage in qualifying life patterns,
contrasting with northern or more densely urbanised countries. We are conscientious that
this question is not that simple, and must consider the influence of the local
entrepreneurial traditions, partnership and citizen participation, local authorities and
community leadership, international wealth and trade in the global economy. However,
these facts accurately raise the possibility of consider urbanisation process and social
cohesion within southern countries, as strategic issues for competitiveness and
sustainability.
As a consequence of the actual paradigm in the information society, the
asymmetric growth process can lead to different outcomes, revealing more solidarity in
upper middle classes families, simply because they afford to help some of their members
to accomplish social mobility. Simultaneously, it will exclude the lower classes through
information access, training and cultural exclusion. 
Employment as far as housing provision will explicitly become a territorial issue.
In rural areas, the poorest people don’t move out because they can't or they fear
the labour market competitiveness in the big city. Southern countries are nowadays
growing within a similar socio-economic context as the northern countries. Unlikely, they
are experiencing a difficult and unrecoverable time lag, due to the absence of past social
welfare policy, moreover facing the recent threat of a structural fund cut with the
predicted EU enlargement and a different macro adjustment.
The weak and ‘delayed’ Welfare State in southern European countries is responsible
for the rise of a major role of the family providing housing and other social support. Yet,
we could consider it, as a government implicit policy, an outcome of several practices
such as soft fiscal enforcement, smooth urban planning and building rules, rent freezing
legislation (inhibiting the functioning of rental market) and the forced extra-work
(stimulating informal activities and tax evasion). 
The first social and worker rights were implemented only after the
democratization process (1974, like holidays, holidays subsidies, marriage licenses andsubsidies, health care national and sector systems, three months for mother children care
after maternity, etc.), which were responsible for the sudden increase in public deficit.
Even before the European integration in 1986, Portugal shifted to a very
restrictive budget policy in order to achieve the EU convergence criteria. Welfare state,
yet less developed in the south, suffered a great pressure to disappear, as it was
happening in the Northern European countries at the time.
1.4. Homeownership incentive
Without relevant social housing provision (table 1), there was a permanent raise in
household indebtedness level. Before the interest rate and inflation decreasing process
this raise was due to the high land and housing prices for private housing promotion; after
1992, the interest rate-decreasing period, as a consequence of new the bank strategies,
capital accumulation pattern and housing policy change
4.
Table 1 - Social housing* in total housing stock (%)
Census Year Lisboa Porto Others % of Total
stock
1950 3.6 1.6 0.2 0.8
1960 5.0 2.5 0.3 1.5
1970 7.0 5.1 0.7 2.7
1981 8.2 5.9 1.4 3.9
1991 5.9 3.8 3.2 4.4
2001 na na na 6,6
Source: adapted (INE 2001) 
*Considering social housing as INE - (INE 1991) define them,
i.e., dwellings built by public institutions and administration.
1.  2001 data is not available on the same basis although the pattern is the same.
2.  The percentage of social housing provision is not that great, although it is 8.25
times higher in half a century.
3.  The 2 metropolitan areas reveal a net increase above average of 16.4 in Lisbon
and 5.6 in Porto (until 1991).
4.  At the local level, most of the communities are shifting to a selling policy of their
social housing stocks.
5.  There is a special program (PER) started in 1995, which goal is to reallocate the
fringe of the households still living in metropolitan shanties. The housing start is
being accomplished within a short delay of 2 years.
                                                
4 Based on interest subsidies and tax relief extended to a great variety of bonus to younger people under 35,
emigrants, retired workers, repair expenses, etc., rather than social housing provision.After the financial market liberalisation and the end of the credit rationing system
in 1992, the total amount of mortgage credit rose exponentially, as a consequence of the
credit subsidies and the legitimate household expectations on future long-term decrease
in inflation and interest rates (table 2). 
Table 2 – Financial Statistics
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
∆ %
national
average 19.67 20.97 20.36 17.33 13.92 13.2 11.68 9.57  7.2
to
househo
lds 10.09 11.07 18.54 15.04 12.97 12.96 10.96 9.38  7.69
to credit
instituti
ons 20.26 21.24 20.46 17.36 13.92 13.19 11.69 9.58  7.19
to other
instituti


















spread na na na na na 10.5 9.6875 7.8 6.46
Total





















e value 5.387 5.107 5.294 5.635 5.911 6.523 6.670 7.588
8.92 65.6
Total 103.403 150.182 166.030 178.073 186.920 185.980 198.582 225.144 261193
Averag
e value 7.476 6.378 6.780 7.132 7.398 8.319 8.259 9.117
10.35 38.4
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Value 84.2 79.8 85.6 87.3 88.8 89.2 89.3 88.7
88.02
Total
number 50.990 57.363 65.050 75.074 96.797 100.714 119.517 151.422 215751 323
Total
value 628.400 810.256 1.032.8 1.193.9 1.307.6 1.451.8 1.712.3 2.265.5 3.371.3
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number 57.976 82.245 83.713 80.458 86.140 86.874 94.888 104.837 116.062 100
Total

























e value 3.824 4.043 4.314 4.148 4.372 3.895 4.356 4.567
4.90 28Source: (INE 1998-2000)
The service and banking liberalisation in Europe produced aggressive marketing
strategies, which, complemented by government smooth inspection upon building,
extended bonus housing credit to other consumption commodities (cars, furniture, and
equipment) embodied this increase. With such a persistent high level in housing rents, it
became financially rational to own instead of rent a house. Thus, private housing
provision continues to rise either in self-promotion or in low quality promotion, with the
connivance of local authority expertise and inspection (table 3).
Table 3 – Total Housing Provision
Source: (INE 1960-1999)
Year  Total  Private   %  Public   %  Co-operative sector  % 
1960 26,660  24,290  91.1  1,995  7.5  375  1.4 
1961 29,803  27,688  92.9  1,759  5.9  356  1.2 
1962 29,666  27,908  91.1  1,501  5.1  257  0.9 
1963 29,710  28,070  94.5  1,319  4.4  321  1.1 
1964 34,944  32,327  92.5  2,386  6.8  231  0.7 
1965 34,940  31,575  90.4  3,077  8.8  288  0.8 
1966 35,891  31,532  87.9  4,143  11.5  216  0.6 
1967 41,328  38,721  93.7  2,368  5.7  239  0.6 
1968 39,231  36,180  92.2  2,882  7.3  168  0.4 
1969 38,593  n.a.     n.a.      135  0.3 
1970 27,875  24,570  88.1  3,221  11.6  84  0.3 
1971 36,007  32,409  90.0  3,453  9.6  145  0.4 
1972 40,611  35,421  87.2  4,895  12.1  295  0.7 
1973 41,933  37,141  88.6  4,559  10.9 233  0.6 
1974 43,402  40,810  94.0  2,339  5.4 253  0.6 
1975  31,967  29,563  92.5  2,180  6.8 224  0.7 
1976  30,028  28,569  95.1  1,296  4.3 163  0.5 
1977 34,893  28,896  82.8  5,848  16.8  149  0.4 
1978 34,379  30,043  87.4  4,235  12.3  101  0.3 
1979 36,430  31,136  85.5  5,154  14.1  140  0.4 
1980 38,231  32,084  88.9  5,665  14.8  482  1.3 
1981 38,632  32,226  88.4  5,490  14.2  916  2.4 
1982 39,857  33,207  83.3  6,060  15.2  590  1.5 
1983  38,191  31,917  83.6  5,525  14.5 749  2.0 
1984 41,250  32,739  79.4  7,278  17.6  1,233  3.0 
1985 35,475  31,738  89.5  2,127  6.0 1,610  4.5 
1986 37,274  34,455  92.4  1,416  3.8  1,403  3.8 
1987 38,833  34,777  89.0  1,391  3.6  2,665  6.9 
1988 45,974  42,414  92.3  1,186  2.0  2,374  5.2 
1989 58,152  50,703  87.2  4,029  6.9  3,420  5.9 
1990 62,081  55,207  88.9  3,460  5.6  3,414  5.5 
1991 63,229  57,808  91.4  1,599  2.5  3,822  6.0 
1992  52,185  46,191  88.5 2,434  4.7  3,560  6.8 
1993 63,199  57,310  90.7  1,602  2.5  4,287  6.8 
1994  59,353  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1995 65,304  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1996 65,607  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1997 70,515  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1998 88,962  n.a.  n.a. n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
1999 105.962  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a.  n.a. 
 Summing up, the direct role of the State was to regulate social relations, to
validate the informal processes and to intervene only in extreme cases of poverty, funding
local authorities in partnership programs
5.
Indirect housing policy was the main trend, acting through easing credit
procedures, introducing several interest rate bonus and allowing different income and
property tax relieves. 
1.5. Recent shifts in housing policy and household practices
In order to fulfil Maastricht convergence criteria, government pushed the public
expense reduction since 1993, with the privatisation of the nationalised and monopoly
enterprises (cement, electricity, telephone, mail), shifting school maintenance, children
transport from central to the local level, and with more enforcement upon tax evasion. On
the other side, local authorities had to get funds to support the 25% of national
participation in EU funding for infrastructure and developing programs. Because regional
level administration is weak in Portugal, only the stronger personality-based local
authorities achieve to absorb the great amount of EU subsidies
6. This means that regional
disparities increased and the coast cities keep pulling people, running for new job
opportunities.
The main outcome of this national policy was the increasing of the housing needs
and shanties in the main metropolitan areas and the promotion of an incredibly high
percentage of family credit indebtedness diminishing national savings. In a recent report
of the National Bank (Portugal 1996) we can read that the household indebtedness is now
higher than the total amount of the Portuguese enterprises one
7. The report also states that
the increase in the household disposable income is greater in the upper level classes.
According to this, the Minister of Labour and Solidarity published recent measures
(MEPAT 1999) revealing a recent shift in housing and household policies:
-  to reinforce bank inspection claiming for the responsibility on how much are they
really lending through housing special credit
                                                
5 Since 1995 it is being applied a special program (P.E.R.) to reinstall a great number of families still living
in shanties in the suburbs of the main towns (near 10.000 new dwellings).
6 Those were the main conclusions of the research on “spatial pattern in FEDER” I carried out.-  to improve the distribution of the minimum guaranteed individual income
-  to create a family protection institution in order to re-evaluate families indebtedness
-  to improve the owner protection in mortgage contracts, even if he has not a legal
marriage situation
-  to stimulate and legalise atypical work, increasing single workers opportunities
-  to change the average week work time, stimulating the part-time jobs.
Unlikely, the amount of disposable money for the minimum guaranteed individual
income was not completely distributed in 1998 for insufficient demand (will it be just an
asymmetric information problem?).
With the increase of divorce rate, houses usually are ‘given’ in Court to the wife
and children, protected in their ownership, but probably will increase the maintenance
financing problems. At the same time, houses are still over dimensioned to those
households (Tables 4a & 4b), which obliges a sharing or renting system in order to buy a
smaller one (taking advantage from mortgage credit re-negotiation)
8.
Table 4a – single and multifamily buildings
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998
Total buildings 23129 22484 26691 25765 28064 35046
1 dwellings 18903 18438 22051 21229 23101 28759
2 dwellings 852 943 1140 1117 1311 1721
%85.4 86.2 86.9 86.7 87.0 87.0
3-11 dwellings 2200 2001 2317 2181 2338 2899
12-30 dwellings 980 907 1004 1046 1149 1428
> 30 dwellings 194 195 179 192 165 239
%14.6 13.8 13.1 13.3 13.0 13.0
Table 4b – Housing characteristics
1995 1997
Year of  unity: %







                                                                                                                                                
7 And it is useful to say that around 76% of it is due to housing mortgage responsibilities, which could raise
the question of what’s the real meaning of homeownership: bank or family owners?
8 Although in 1997 there is a sign of changing attitude, choosing smaller houses (nº divisions).Typology % 1995 1997






















Sources: (INE 1993-1999), (INE 1993-1999), (INE 1995)
1.6. Main Changes in household situation
Household structure is mostly a dependent variable on each member life project.
Among other reasons, employment expectations, divorce/marriage rates, number of
children, family extension, housing attributes are, hence, an important feature. The main
changes occur in the bigger cities, but there is a general trend to diminish the extension of
the nuclear household as a consequence of the increasing expenses related to training
needs and job/social mobility. 
Housing mortgage is a huge restriction to new life projects, because sometimes
people need to move quickly, even if they only achieve to sell the house later on. This
could be another explanation for social exclusion, once only the members of the upper
class households can afford to move and pay for training or to buying/renting another
house in the city they find a new job. 
The diversity in the income sources we have described above will tend to
diminish as long as the economic integration process goes on. In the 60s, family
neighbourhood was decisive to kinship relationships; nowadays, individual labour
1.  Construction of single
housing largely exceeds the
multifamily dwellings,
apparently revealing higher
demand for more private
and qualified places and the
urban sprawl.
2.  There is a sign about
housing stock renewal
(houses built after 1981)
and also some rebuilding of
old houses (1997).
3.  The number of divisions in
new houses indicates the
shift to a small family size
although within larger
spaces (≥ 80 m2) and better
facilities.solutions gives rise to different localisation choices that, added to the increased rupture in
family structure, will worst off a lot of household situations.
For all these reasons I think that kinship networks will only be useful and
constitute a comparative advantage if social policy shifts from housing to labour/
education/health and training issues, trying to offset the natural real income decrease for
lower class households (though it shows a smooth average increasing).
It will be also useful to fix population in the rural areas surrounding the cities,
stimulating them to guarantee their self subsistence and to resist to the urban temptation
of selling the land for a new house they will not be able to maintain and moving away to
places where they have neither identification values or qualified skills to work.
Anyway, according to the 2001 Census, we have a housing stock of 5,36 million
for 3,7 million households, which represents a ratio of 1,34 hoses per household. This is a
huge number considering that in earlier 90s, we had a large house deficit. In the last
decade, 84 thousand dwellings were built in average per year, reaching over the 100
thousand in 1999 and 2000, which means 8,4 dwellings concluded per each 1000
inhabitant, in average every year.
At the end of the 70s, the housing stock was close to 3,4 million dwellings and
new construction was far from household growth, increasing the incentive to informal
market to grow (inter census data revealed that the lag between housing stock and permits
was over the 87%).
During the 80s, the average of constructed dwellings per 1000 inhabitants was
7,5, when the household growth reached the 226 thousands, though the desequilibrium
remained yet.
Informal sector represented 43% of new houses and from the whole construction
just 37% was occupied for permanent shelter, while 31% was reserved to temporary
occupation or just vacant. This was the period where credit was rationed and rental
market was frozen living over one third for no use at all. It was only in the 90s that households, as a consequence of the junction in four
important economic factors, absorbed 70% of the built houses: credit liberalization; rent
liberation; inflation stabilization and employment growth.
1.7. Employment structure and labour market trends
Source: (INE 1995)
During 1999 we can state an apparently positive situation in employment
conditions. As a matter of fact, in spite of the decreasing rate in GDP growth, total
employment has grown 2 points in the last year and unemployment stabilized at a 4.5%
of total active population. At the same time, Working Population also increased around 1
point, which reveals a strong sensibility to the expansionist economic cycle. According to
recent published data by the National Statistic Institute (INE 1999) the increase in
dependent jobs is higher than average (3.4% against 1.9%), with different rates on non-
permanent (12.3%) and permanent contracts (1.4%)(Tables 5a,b,c).
Table 5a - Work Contract 
   1993  %  1994  %  1995  %  1996  %  1997  %  1998  %  
EMPLOYMENT 
contract T  4240.6   
4275.
4    4218.4    4264.3   
4358.
2    4735.9   
 
 M  2355  55.5 
2370.
7  55.4  2323.3 55.1 2354.4 55.2 
2393.
2  54.9 2633.9  55.6 
 
 F  1885.5  44.5 
1904.
5  44.5  1895  44.9 1909.8 44.8  1965  45.1  2102  44.4 
 
Working for 
other  T 3112.2  73 
3062.
3  72  3041.6  72  3036.1  71 
3082.
4  70  3386  71.5 
 
 M  1709.2  54.9 
1673.
4  55  1635.8 53.8 1648.9 54.3 
1672.
2  54.2 1865.3  55.1 
 
 F  1403  45.1 
1388.
9  45  1405.7 46.2 1387.2 45.7 
1410.
3  45.8 1520.7  44.9 
 
Single self work  T  763.8  18  823.3  19.2  825.4  19.5  890  20.8  941.6  21.6  930.7  19.6  
 M  403  52.8  440.4  53  450.5  54.6  472  53.0  502.8  53.4  505  54.3  
 F  360.8  47.2  382.9  47  374.9  45.4  418  47.0  438.8  46.6  425.7  45.7  
Self work & 
employer  T 281.7  6.6  286.7  6.7  268.7  6.3  262.7  6.1  261.1  5.9  278.1  5.8 
 
 M  209.4  74.3  213.3  74  200.9  74.8  197.5  75.2  186.9  71.6  204.9  73.7  
 F  72.3  25.7  73.3  26  67.8  25.2  65.1  24.8  74.2  28.4  73.2  26.3  
Family non paid 
worker  T 82.9  1.9  103.1  2.4  82.7  1.9  75.5  1.7  73.1  1.6  141.1  2.9 
 
 M  33.4  40.3  43.6  42  36.1  43.7  36  47.7  31.3  42.8  58.7  41.6  
 F  49.4  59.6  59.4  58  46.6  56.3  39.5  52.3  41.7  57.0  82.4  58.4  
Other T  250.2  5.9  310.8  7.2  310.8  7.3  324.5  7.6  310.8  7.1  231.8  4.8  
 M  117.1  46.8  155.7  50  157  50.5  156.8  48.3  149.4  48.1  98.2  42.4  
 F  133.2  53.2  155.4  50  153.9  49.5  167.8  51.7  161.4  51.9  133.6  57.6  
 
1.  Almost 3 quarters of the total contracts concern people working for other; around 
1/5 is the number of self workers; the share of people working at home without 
being paid is lower and unstable, offsetting the periods of work-off. 
2.  The sexual structure of employment reveals the expected tendency for male 
predominance in self-work & employer, while female dominance emerges in non-
paid work at home. 
3.    1999 %     1999 %      1999 % 
 
EMPLOYMENT 
contract T  3508.2    TERM  T  483.3  13.7  NO  TERM  T  2819.4  80 
 M  1898.7  54.1    M  218.4  45.2    M  1557.8  55.3 
 The National Bank (BP) explains this effect as an outcome of the expected labour
reallocation facing the higher rigidity of national labour legislation. Workers are
progressively tied to the international weekly timetable, considering the total amount of
those who worked more than 40 hours a week (28.3 in 1998 to 24.2% in 1999 (Table 6).
Employment growth, produced a structural change; actually, Construction, Electricity,
Gas and Water increased at a rate of 7%, as well as Public Administration, Education and
Health (6.9%) and Other Services (4.7%); meanwhile, there is a decrease in
Manufacturing Industry (- 2.4), Agriculture and Fishermen (- 4.4) and Mining Industry (-
16.6). According to a fixed sample that INE applies, employment trimester rotation is
lowering with just 0.7% moving from employment to unemployment and 1.5% from
employment to inactivity. We also can conclude that 22.4% of the unemployment stock
moved to inactivity and the conversion from temporary in permanent contracts reached
the 6.8%, while the reverse rotation only reached the 0.5%.
Another interesting remark is that in spite of the decreasing unemployment rate, it
is not that clear that the number of subsidized people also decreased, even considering the
universe of unemployed people and subsidized unemployed is not the same
9. The rise in
subsidized unemployed enhances the important role of subsidies in the determination of
the unemployment average and long-term unemployment duration. Furthermore
following the same INE survey, unemployed population received a subsidy representing
62.6% of the net average salary in 1998’s contracted work, against 60.2% in 1999. This
amount could be considered a great incentive to diminish job demand in the labour
market and for this reason, an instrument to reduce the intensity of unemployment-
employment rotation.
The real wage consequence is a total increase of 3% (similar to 1998), which is a
little bit higher in Public Administration than in corporation sector. It is the 4
th
consecutive year of real wage increase at a higher rate than per capita productivity
increase.
Finally we shall say that there is a strong (negative) correlation between self-
employment and unemployment rates, which partially explains the power to reallocate
                                                
9 From all the registered unemployed people, those who receive the subsidies represent 27% because the
other 73% either were not eligible or had overcome the maximum unemployment period to be eligible.the work force even within rigid labour market conditions. The full explanation could be
asserted as the “…junction between the high employment rule protection with the tax and
social insurance contribution incentives given to self-employment unlike other alternative
employment opportunities” (Portugal 1999).
Summing up, there is plain evidence that self-employment is playing an important
role in labour market dynamics, mainly within labour segments, which show higher
unemployment rates – under qualified workforce – thus contributing to a low global
unemployment rate in Portugal (last number November 2001 - 4%). But using a more
qualitative approach to this low unemployment rate we can state a link between this rate
level and the slow level in industrial restructuring, which means that there will be no way
out to long-term employment. The unemployment rate is being sustained through a
stronger subsidy State policy
10, which pushes public expenditure to dangerous levels.
Within the European context, national governments have lost the exchange rate
policy instrument, meaning that the macroeconomic adjustments should be nowadays
achieved through other instruments. Among these other possibilities we have the stock
foreign sales, the unemployment rate and also the private indebtedness level. Looking at
the Portuguese foreign accounts (Table 7) we see that either the Import/Export balance or
the current deficit are negative, reaching around the 8% of the GDP in 1999, against the
2% in Austria and substantial surplus in Ireland and Spain. In a 2-decade analysis we
reached the same deficit level than in the early 80s, which means Portugal it’s losing
national competitiveness and comparing to the rest of the EU-15 countries it’s living an
advanced stage in the economic cycle (open economy consequence).
In the short run we can be ‘glad’ with the data information but we must be
worried, once in the EU monetary environment all the economic adjustments will be
achieved in the long run, which turns the revert effect task much more difficult.
                                                
10  In recent Economics undergraduate research I have been supervising, there is strong evidence that
Training Programs funded by European Funds achieve more Social goals than new employment places.
Following the life track of those workers we cannot find an important market absorption rate. Training
Programs are not territorial-based and not submitted to a competitive strategy planning.(Portugal 2000)
2. BEHAVIOURAL RESPONSES
- Changing attitudes
- Risk reduction strategies
- Housing mobility
- More prudent lending and borrowing
There are recent studies and newspaper interviews published in Portugal
((Marques 1999), (Mateus 1999)) showing some dangerous consequences of the rise in
household indebtedness for the Portuguese economy. The first quoted study considers
that Portugal is expanding to ‘European open credit society’ in a path they call the
‘Northern American matrix’. 
Private credit sharply grew in the 90s as a result of two convergent effects: either
on the supply side – liberalisation and financial innovation, housing credit support and
interest rate decrease – or on the demand side for credit - changes in consumption
behaviour, cultural relationship shift against credit and increase in disposable income. 
Housing credit for homeownership is the main indebtedness source (76%
11 in
1998. In 1997 the indebtedness imbalance due to housing credit is 37% of the disposable
income against 15% in 1990; the consumption credit also raised 10 points in the same
period (13 against 3%). The total amount of the household indebtedness represents 50%
in 1997 against 18% in the beginning of the 90s. 
Nevertheless Portuguese household indebtedness is still lower comparing to the
European average and we cannot clearly assert that the Portuguese cost will be higher
                                                
11 There is no coincidence in the number. Marques, M. M. e. N., Vítor (1999). Endividamento in Dossier
Investimento. Economia Pura: 46-49.
 refer to 76%, a national newspaper “Diário de Notícias from June, 1
st, 1999, refers to 71% and
Mateus, A. (1999). Dossier "Essencial"; entrevista com consultor do BP. Semanário Económico: 4-8.
Table 7 – Portuguese Foreign Accounts – Principal 
Components (Net values) 
 
  1997 1998 1999 1998  1999 2000 1998 1999  2000 
      Jan-Mar Jan-Mar  Jan-Mar Mar  Mar  Mar 




























































































































Source: Banco de Portugal, Indicadores de Conjuntura, Maio 2000:15. than in some Northern European countries (e.g., UK, Sweden). However there is some
evidence that habits and attitudes towards credit are changing once young people is the
most indebted group. 
Data from the National Bank (B.P.) in 1998, suggests that only 2.5% of the bank
private indebtedness imbalance is ‘doubtful’ (1.2% in housing credit and 4.5% in
consumption). The other available information gathered from the 2 main Portuguese
financial institutions reveals that only 4.1% of the total contracted credit had more than 3
months repayment delay. (Marques 1999) refers to the UK as an important advisor
example, because from the same 3.9% level in 1989 the > 2 months repayment delay
reached the 9.3% two years later!
(Mateus 1999) enhances the comprehension of this phenomenon when he alerts to
the difference between the 2 increase levels – 30% in the household credit against the 5-
6% increase in the disposable income. Furthermore this has been a quick change, which
doesn’t allow short run comparisons and suggests more cautious analysis because per
capita Portuguese income is 50% of the American citizens, which means a completely
different percentage of households with housing credit affordability. 
A personal survey just made near the main Portuguese housing credit institutions
(representing a housing credit share of 65%) show that household indebtedness is mainly
due to extra commodity consumption, rather than from housing repayments. With the last
decade decrease in the interest rate people suddenly expected they could afford to
improve their life standards and were tempted to ask for credit beyond their saving
capacities
12. Anyway all of the surveyed institutions confirmed that is not a problematic
issue till now, which did not avoid they are studying security measures to those risks
mostly based on the management of personal and local credit situations.
In spite of the global structural changes, Portuguese population doesn’t look like
to diminish the demand for new homes as owners. We do not have deep sociological
studies providing us a satisfactory explanation, nevertheless we can feel that being a
homeowner is sooner or later an important goal for everyone and two economic factors
                                                                                                                                                
 to 80%. The 76.7% is our own result based in financial tables for 1997.
12 A research centre in real estate evaluation in U. Politecnica de Valencia – Spain - concludes, after a long-
term study, that household behaviour related with home buying is very stable over time and constant in thecan underpin these behaviour: first, rent level for new homes is very high attending to the
interest rate performance; buying a house it’s still a rational choice, once equity level will
offset credit cost, due to housing market volatility. Secondly, the late urbanization
processes and the road infrastructure investment is still going on, raising the opportunities
to suddenly raise housing prices across the country and allow people to expect
speculative profits wherever they buy. In a few years we think that leadership of housing
promoters will decrease and then housing quality will be the break point to understand
who wins and loses in the process.
Another issue is the heterogeneity of the process across the country. Recent
published data on overall housing prices is an incredible confirmation of this situation,
while for a national average index 100, we have 134 in Lisboa metropolitan area, 107.5 in
Algarve, 104 in Porto metropolitan area, while in the interior country the index goes over
the 67.5
13.
Further research based on more appropriated surveys are needed, in order to have
a deeper understanding of behavioural answers to these issues, mainly because we have
any information that relates labour and housing tenure to household responses.
3. POLICY IMPLICATIONS
According to everything I was able to show, housing and labour markets as well
as social welfare issues reveals a high correlation and imply a cautious cross analysis
between micro and macro levels as well as to international conceptualisation.
Globalisation is a very quick phenomenon with important lag reactions in each country,
depending on its particular ranking at the international competition game. Belonging to
the EU gives higher confidence to reach the main development goals; being a small and
open economy brings higher risks to deal with the economic cycle; looking at housing
and labour market functioning as a strict social and short run issue is a dangerous and
unsustainable policy.
                                                                                                                                                
percentage they could save after basic needs provision. When people save more than before, they spend it
on housing improvement or higher quality houses purchases.
13 INE (2001). Sistemas de Indicadores de Preços na Construção e Habitação, Instituto Nacional de
Estatística.Then it is important to underline that socio-economic policies shifted a lot with
the globalisation process within the EU. It changed from the national to the global level
and at the same time, within each country, from the national to the local level; the focus
shifted from the short to the long run effects and, consequently, from the State to the
citizen level. The best each country is able to define its long run policies, the more it can
prepare the citizen answer to this global challenge. Of course we consider that
educational, health and training policies are, nowadays, territorial issues asking for
network approaches. 
These are the challenges to this research group!
CONCLUSIONS
The main conclusions in UK paper are similar to the Portuguese case, namely
asserting that housing policies promoted homeownership and recent financial pressure
over government expenditure tended to diminish subsidies and risk insurance of the
indebted. Unlikely the UK we have no available data to confirm the exact link between
the labour situation of the indebted and the housing mortgage arrears. In Portugal, the
main financial institutions and the Consumer Observatory say that indebtedness is not a
dangerous problem yet, although it has been increasing in the last 2 years at the same
time that housing transactions increase in number and value. These facts enable us to
predict that heterogeneity (both social and geographical) is an important phenomenon in a
country where unemployment is rather stable and low considering the EU context.
Behavioural responses facing these trends also need further research and data
provided by the financial institutions just allow us to say that people tend to incur in
longer term mortgages and banks oblige them to pay considerable mortgage insurance
costs. Anytime repayment difficulties happen, negotiations about delaying mortgage
duration are found. Housing is a very important cyclical business, which makes difficult
to disentangle changes due to structural causes and ask for very cautious research
methodologies considering that average indicators give rise to a number of considerable
misinterpretations. References:
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